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Notes
Advantages and Limitations of Current Employee
Ownership Assistance Acts to Workers Facing a
Plant Closure
Plant closures' are a serious problem in the United States. Job loss
is a harsh reality or an ominous threat facing many American workers.
In many instances, a plant closure not only affects individual employees,
but also can devastate an entire community.2
1. In this Note the term "plant closure" refers to the various ways a business may shut
down: for instance, an employer may shut down only part of his/her business or the entire
operation, or an employer may close down a plant in one area and reopen it in another
location.
2. In 1982 more than 600 plants and factories across the United States shut down per-
manently, resulting in the loss of approximately 215,000 jobs. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF-
FAIRS, INC., SUMMARY REPORT FOR 1982: LAYOFFS, PLANT CLOSINGS AND CONCESSION
BARGAINING 3 (1983). A study by the California Employment Development Department
found that in California between 1980 and 1983 at least 1,385 plants shut down, putting ap-
proximately 145,000 employees out of work. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT STUDIES, UNI-
VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 'BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA DATA BRIEF 1 (Sept. 1983) (citing
EMPLOYMENT DATA & RESEARCH DIVISION, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT, CLOSED BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA: FEBRUARY 1980-MAY 1983 (June 10,
1983)).
After a plant shutdown, workers often suffer from loss of income, prolonged unemploy-
ment, deteriorating mental and physical health, and increased family tensions. Most victims of
plant closures have worked at the same job 10 or more years. For them, a layoff results in the
loss of a career and secure employment. Many workers never again achieve their full earning
capacity. Workers affected by plant closures experience increased occurrences of alcoholism,
drug abuse, heart disease, and suicide. Social service agencies report increased occurrences of
spouse and child abuse within the families of plant closure victims. Kay & Griffin, Plant
Closures: Assessing the Victim's Remedies, 19 WILLAMETrE L.J. 199, 202-04 (1983); Office of
Planning and Policy Development, California Employment Development Department, Plan-
ning Guidebook for Communities Facing a Plant Closure or Mass Layoff (1983) (copy on file
with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Planning Guidebook]; see also C. CHA-
VEz, STAFF OF ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE, A SUMMARY OF ISSUES RELATING
TO PLANT CLOSURES, JOB DISLOCATION & MASS LAYOFFS 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
WAYS & MEANS REPORT].
The impact on a community where a plant closure occurs goes well beyond the jobs lost at
that plant. Unemployment may rise in secondary industries and local business which depend
on economic input from the plant and its employees. A closure can mean a large reduction in
the local tax revenue. As a result, public services such as police and fire protection, schools,
and health and social service programs may be cut back at the time they are needed most. In
Youngstown, Ohio, during the year after the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company perma-
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Plants close for many different reasons. 3 Sometimes a subsidiary
plant is profitable, but not productive enough to meet the profit rate re-
quired by its corporate parent.4  The parent company's overall business
plans may no longer include the branch plant.5 Sometimes the plant is
simply no longer economically viable.6 Outmoded equipment and facili-
ties, the threat of foreign competition, shifts to overseas production, or a
decline in the demand for the plant's products may contribute to the
economic decline of a business. 7 Employees confronted with a plant clo-
sure have several legal options to help them stop a closure, limit its im-
pact, or prepare themselves for its occurrence. 8 In some cases they can
turn to the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to
force the employer to bargain over the closure and its effects, to stop the
closure if it is an attempt to destroy their union, or to enforce a collective
bargaining agreement if it contains plant closing provisions. 9 Addition-
ally, they may be able to utilize principles of contract law to establish an
agreement between the employer and employees to keep the plant open,
principles of eminent domain to have the business taken over by a local
governmental unit, or other traditional legal theories.10 Finally, a few
state and local governments have adopted legislation that deals directly
with the plant closure problem by requiring pre-notification of a closure
or severance pay for the affected workers.I Such options, however, are
available only in very special circumstances.1 2
Another response to plant closure has been to transfer ownership of
the enterprise to the employees. In the last ten years employees have
acquired approximately sixty firms which otherwise would have
nently laid off 4,100 workers, the community lost an additional 1,650 to 3,600 jobs and mil-
lions of dollars in retail sales and state and local taxes. United States Representative William
Ford (D. Mich.) has said that Youngstown was "as devastated as we left some cities in Europe
after World War II." Kay & Griffin, supra, at 204; Conference on Dislocated Workers, 115
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 305, 306 (April 16, 1984); Planning Guidebook, supra, at 7-8.
3. See generally M. BOLLE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, ISSUE BRIEF No. IB80068, PLANT CLOSINGS AND RELOCATIONS 1-2 (1980); M.
BOLLE, OVERVIEW OF PLANT CLOSING AND INDUSTRIAL MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE
UNITED STATES 6-8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as M. BOLLE, OVERVIEW OF PLANT CLOSING];
C. SQUIRE, M. KIESCHNICK & J. PARZEN, AN EMPLOYEE BUYOUT HANDBOOK 1-2 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as C. SQUIRE]; Bluestone & Harrison, Why Corporations Close Profitable
Plants, WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOC'Y 15 (May/June 1980); Boyle, Plant Closings:
Options for Economic Adjustment, 6 ECON. DEV. COMMENTARY 17 (1982); Kay & Griffin,
supra note 2, at 205-06.
4. C. SQUIRE, supra note 3, at 1-2; Bluestone & Harrison, supra note 3, at 16.
5. C. SQUIRE, supra note 3, at 2; Bluestone & Harrison, supra note 3, at 19.
6. See C. SQUIRE, supra note 3, at 1.
7. WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
8. See infra notes 28-65 & accompanying text.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982); see infra notes 28-47 & accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 48-58 & accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 59-65 & accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., infra notes 28-65 & accompanying text.
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closed. 13
A successful employee buyout is an attractive alternative to a plant
closure. A buyout can save jobs and reduce the effect of unemployment
on the displaced workers and their communities. 14 State and local gov-
ernments benefit from the continued payment of taxes by the employees
and the business.' 5 A buyout can also prevent an increased demand by
the displaced workers for welfare, unemployment, and other types of
government assistance.' 6 Finally, a buyout may strengthen the economic
base of the state and local community if employee ownership results in
higher productivity. I7
In recent years several states have enacted legislation to encourage
employee ownership.' There are two types of such legislation: broad-
ened ownership assistance acts (BOAAs) 19 and employee ownership
13. C. SQUIRE, supra note 3, at 1; L. WINTNER, RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 140, EM-
PLOYEE BUYOUTS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO PLANT CLOSINGS 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as L.
WINTNER].
14. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
15. See id. at 8.
16. See id. at 7.
17. Employee ownership may not necessarily increase productivity and efficiency. Em-
ployees must also participate in the management of the business. If employees do participate,
their motivation and productivity may rise because they have a personal as well as a financial
stake in the business. Therefore, when legislators draft employee ownership legislation, they
should consider how to encourage employee participation. See Long, Worker Ownership and
Job Attitudes: A Field Study, 21 INDUS. REL. 196, 212 (1982); Stableski, Do Employee-Owned
Firms Lead to Higher Productivity?, 8 WORLD OF WORK REP. 49 (1983); see also Can Work-
place Democracy Boost Productivity?, 43 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 10 (1982).
18. Employee Ownership Assistance Act of 1983, ch. 998, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347
(West) (codified at CAL. GoV'T CODE § 91502. 1(b)(3); scattered sections of CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE (West Supp. 1984)); Employer Ownership Assistance Act, Pub. Act No. 82-991, 1982
Ill. Legis. Serv. 2584 (West) (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1301-1313 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983)); Broadened Ownership Act, ch. 821, 1980 Md. Laws 2868 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 14J (1982)); Act of July 2, 1979, Pub. Act No. 44, 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts 62
(codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.751-.759 (Supp. 1983)) (lapsed 1984); Act of Dec.
31, 1982, ch. 15, 1983 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 92 (West) (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 290.26(2) (West Supp. 1984)); Employee Stock Ownership Plan Act, ch. 471, 1983 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. 2654 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.2711-90 (West Supp. 1984)); Act of
July 30, 1983, ch. 788, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1478 (codified at N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW
§§ 1801(1l)(a), (14), 1836(a)-(g) (McKinney Supp. 1983)).
Michigan's statute lapsed on July 2, 1984, as required by its sunset provision. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.759(i) (Supp. 1983). Currently pending in the Michigan legislature
is a bill which would reenact and expand the state's EOAA. H.R. 5514, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1984). H.R. 5514 would expand the Act's coverage to worker cooperatives and nonplant
closure situations. It would also repeal the sunset provision. Other bills introduced at the
same time as H.R. 5514 would create a loan program to help employee buyouts, give state
preference in purchasing to employee-owned businesses, include employee owned corporations
in the state's Economic Development Corporations Act, and allow employee-owned corpora-
tions to refund outstanding bonds in advance of redemption or maturity. H.R. 5510-5513, 82d
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1984).
19. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14J (1982).
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assistance acts (EOAAs).2 0 BOAAs are designed to broaden the base of
capital ownership.2 I EOAAs, on the other hand, are specifically
designed to encourage employee buyouts, if feasible, in the event of a
plant closure.22
This Note examines whether EOAAs adequately address the plant
closure problem, focusing specifically on an EOAA recently passed in
California. The Note first briefly reviews the legal options available to
those adversely affected by a plant closure in the absence of state statutes
that encourage employee ownership. 23 The Note then explains in detail
the differences between BOAAs and EOAAs.24 An analysis and review
of several recently enacted EOAAs follows, including a detailed exami-
nation of California's EOAA.2 5 The Note then discusses the general ben-
efits and limitations of EOAAs, specifically California's, focusing on the
problems that arise during the implemention of EOAAs due to the lack
of guidelines and of a requirement that an employer give notice of a plant
closure. 26 The author argues that EOAAs cannot effectively encourage
employee buyouts of plants unless they contain adequate guidelines for
implementation and notification requirements. Finally, the Note sug-
gests how EOAAs could be improved to encourage more effectively em-
ployee buyouts of a closing plant.27
Legal Options To Address Plant Closures
Labor Law
Labor law provides several potential remedies for employees seeking
to stop or to delay a plant closure.28 For example, employees who have
successfully negotiated for a collective bargaining agreement that con-
tains provisions governing plant shutdowns may seek to enforce the
agreement under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.29
Absent a specific provision governing plant closure, a decision to close
operations may be arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement,
and the employees may seek an injunction preventing the shutdown
20. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.751-.759 (Supp. 1983) (lapsed 1984).
21. See infra notes 84-92 & accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 93-97 & accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 27-65 & accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 81-100 & accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 104-39 & accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 140-65 & accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 166-68 & accompanying text.
28. This Note considers only those remedies available under federal labor law. The state
labor codes which might be of particular interest here are those of states with EOAAs: Califor-
nia, Illinois, Michigan, and New York. In these states the labor codes have no specific provi-
sions regarding plant closures.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). For further discussion of such suits, see infra notes 32-34 &
accompanying text.
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while arbitration is pending.30 Finally, the motive for the closure or the
manner in which it is conducted may provide the basis for the employees
to file an unfair labor practice charge against the employer under either
section 8(a)(3) or section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.31
Employees are likely to be most successful under the NLRA when
they have successfully negotiated for provisions in their union contract
that limit transfer of work or unilateral management decisions to shut
down a business. 32 Courts and arbitrators have enforced such provisions
in a labor contract. 33 One impediment to this strategy is the employer's
reluctance to accept provisions of this nature in the labor contract.34
Another option available to employees is arbitration. If a union can
establish that a disputed issue, in this case a plant closure, is arbitrable,
then it may seek an injunction in court preventing the closure pending
arbitration.35 The most reliable method to ensure that an employer's de-
cision to shut down operations will be considered arbitrable is to obtain a
collective bargaining agreement containing language that expressly
makes plant closure decisions arbitrable. Even absent such express lan-
guage, however, the arbitration remedy is not foreclosed, because the
30. See infra notes 35-38 & accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 39-47 & accompanying text.
32. For instance, United Shoeworkers, Local 127, had a clause in their contract which
stated "it is agreed by the Employer that the shop or factory shall not be removed from the
County of Philadelphia during the life of this agreement." Local 127, United Shoeworkers v.
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 1962). See generally A. LAWRENCE & P.
CHOWN, LABOR TRAINING SERIES, PART II, PLANT CLOSINGS AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR UNION NEGOTIATORS (guide for union negotiators on plant closures,
transfers of operations, and technological changes).
33. See, e.g., Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Div. No. 9, 305 F.2d 177
(8th Cir. 1962) (holding that a contract clause limiting the subcontracting of work will be
enforced); Local 127, United Shoeworkers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1962) (holding that the employer breached his contract when he moved his business despite a
clause in the contract prohibiting such action); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 58 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 653 (1972) (Lande, Arb.) (enforcing a contract clause which limited when layoffs could
occur). See generally P. PITEGOFF, PLANT CLOSINGS: LEGAL REMEDIES WHEN JOBS DISAP-
PEAR 10 (1981); Kay & Griffin, supra note 2, at 216.
34. See 2 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND CONTRACTS § 65:3-4 (1983) (only 18% of sample contracts included plant reloca-
tion provisions); see also A. LAWRENCE & P. CHOWN, supra note 33, at 3-18; P. PITEGOFF,
supra note 34, at 9-10. It is also possible, but less likely, that courts may interpret the labor
contract to contain an implied promise to restrict management discretion about decisions to
transfer work or to eliminate positions. See, eg., UAW v. Avis Indus. Corp., 56 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2632 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (denying motion for summary judgment because there was a
genuine issue of material fact that the employer might have breached his duty of good faith
and fair dealing when he shut down a plant although there was no express contract clause
prohibiting this action); Kaiser Steel Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 25 (1965) (Bernstein, Arb.)
(implying a limit on the contracting out of work in light of other arbitration awards in the steel
industry). See generally P. PITEGOFF, supra note 33, at 10; Kay & Griffin, supra note 2, at 216.
35. See, eg., Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554
F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Supreme Court has established a presumption in favor of arbitration
when the parties disagree over the arbitrability of a particular dispute. 36
Once the decision to close a plant is found arbitrable, the union
must still persuade the court that an injunction preserving the status quo
during the arbitration process is necessary. 37 This result will probably
not be difficult to obtain because the workers should be able to prove
irreparable harm from the impact of a closure. Moreover, if the com-
pany were allowed to relocate and the arbitrator then decided that the
employer is required to negotiate, the union would have an increased
burden to convince the company not only that it should not relocate, but
also that it should move back to its original location. 38
The unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA protect workers
who are threatened by a plant closure in two ways. First, section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA 39 forbids discrimination in an employment decision regard-
ing hiring or tenure in order to encourage or discourage union member-
ship. Thus, if an employer decides to close a plant to destroy the
incumbent union or to discourage union organizing in that plant or an-
other plant, he has committed an unfair labor practice. For example, in
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.4° the United
States Supreme Court held that a partial closing of a business was an
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(3) because the em-
ployer's decision was "motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of
the remaining plants of the single employer."'4 1 The Darlington court,
however, expressly limited its decision to partial plant closings and noted
36. "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (foot-
note omitted); see also Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 119 (relying on Warrior & Gulf in holding that
a dispute was arbitrable). But cf Local 13, Int'l Fed'n of Professional and Technical Eng'rs v.
General Electric Co., 531 F.2d 1178 (3rd Cir. 1976) (holding that when a dispute over transfer
of work was expressly excluded from an arbitration clause, the labor union was not entitled to
an injunction preventing the transfer of work).
37. Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 119-20; Rochester Indep. Workers, Local No. I v. General
Dynamics Corp., 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2540 (W.D.N.Y. 1970); see P. PITEGOFF, supra note 33,
at 8-9.
Factors the courts consider in determining whether preliminary injunctions should issue
include: 1) Whether the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law or will be irreparably harmed
if the injunction is not issued; 2) whether the threatened harm to the plaintiff if the injunction
is denied is greater than the potential harm to the defendant if the injunction is issued; 3)
whether the plaintiff has at least a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; and 4)
whether the granting of the injunction will harm the public interest. See, e.g., O'Conner v.
Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
38. See Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 122.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
40. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
41. Id. at 275.
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in dictum its view that an employer may close his/her entire business
with impunity, even if this decision is based on anti-union animus.42 Ad-
ditionally, an earlier court of appeals case, NLRB v. Rapid Bindery,
Inc.,43 indicated that as long as anti-union animus is not the employer's
primary motivation, the employer can consider his/her relationship with
the union even when making a decision to partially close his/her busi-
ness.44 Because section 8(a)(3) does not provide any protection if the
employer closes the entire business, it is not a remedy amenable to broad
application to halt or to delay a plant closure.
Second, under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,45 an employer has a
duty to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, or other conditions of
employment. Under this section, employees may argue that job security
is a fundamental condition of employment and, therefore, that the em-
ployer must bargain in good faith before closing a plant. The application
of this statute is limited, however, by the Court's holding in First Na-
tional Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.46 The United States Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the employer must bargain before closing a
plant and held that the employer was only required to bargain over the
effects of a closure.47
The traditional labor law remedies discussed above have limited ap-
plication as solutions to plant closures. Enforcement of contractual pro-
visions, as well as obtaining injunctions based on the provisions, depends
on an ability to negotiate such language into a contract. The NLRA
offers effective remedies only for partial closures due to anti-union ani-
mus or for a failure to bargain over the effects of a closure. More impor-
tantly, the NLRA only protects unionized workers or employees
involved in collective bargaining or organizing.
42. Id. at 273-74.
43. 293 F.2d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1961).
44. Id. at 175. This decision was not overruled by Darlington because in Darlington the
Supreme Court did not consider whether motives other than anti-union animus were involved
in the employer's decision to close part of his business. See 380 U.S. at 275.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
46. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
47. Id. at 681-86; see also Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In
Fibreboard the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of an employer's duty to
bargain over the decision to contract out work previously done by members of the collective
bargaining unit. The court decided that the employer had violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) by
failing to negotiate over this decision. The case, while not directly dealing with a plant closure,
does illustrate that the Supreme Court will not hesitate to limit an employer's power to make
discretionary decisions when the Court considers those decisions to concern terms and condi-
tions of employment. In Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) imposed a duty on the employer to bargain over a decision to close a
plant. The NLRB considered the employer's failure to bargain over this decision a violation of
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Ozark Trailers, 161 N.L.R.B. at 564. As discussed in the text, the
Supreme Court has severely limited this duty. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
Legal Remedies Outside Labor Law
In addition to the remedies under labor law, employees seeking to
halt a plant closure may have a remedy under other legal theories. In
Local 1330, United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. United States Steel Corp. ,48
the union sought to enjoin the closing of a steel mill by claiming breach
of contract, promissory estoppel, possession of a right in the nature of an
easement, and antitrust violations. 49
Although the union's request for an injunction was denied, the
court's treatment of the claims illustrates that under different factual sit-
uations some of these legal theories might be successful in stopping a
plant closure. For example, the district court held that the union's claim
of promissory estoppel failed for two reasons. First, the union could not
have reasonably relied upon the company's promise to keep the plant
open.50 Second, the condition precedent of the promise, that the plant
become profitable, was never fulfilled. 5' The breach of contract claim
also failed because the condition precedent was not fulfilled and because
the corporate officers who made the promise lacked the authority to keep
the plant open.52 The court's opinion implies that the promissory estop-
pel theory could be successful if an employer's assurances to continue
plant operations were so clear that the workers could reasonably rely on
them and if either the promise entailed no condition precedent or the
condition was fulfilled. Similarly, if a corporate officer had the authority
to enter into an agreement with company employees, the court might
enforce the contract.
Employees have also brought suits for damages, as opposed to in-
junctive relief, when a company closes a plant. In California, the non-
unionized employees of an Atari plant are currently suing the company
in a class action suit.5 3 The plaintiffs are seeking damages for the harm
caused to them by the defendant's failure to notify them of its decision to
relocate the plant at which they had been employed. The Atari employ-
ees are claiming, inter alia, breach of contract and a breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiffs are also claiming
48. 492 F. Supp 1 (N.D. Ohio 1980) affid in part and vacated in part, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th
Cir. 1980).
49. 492 F. Supp. at 4-11. All of the union's claims were dismissed by the district court.
Id. at 11-12. The appellate court affirmed all of the lower court's opinion except its dismissal
of the union's antitrust claim. 631 F.2d at 1282-83.
50. 492 F. Supp. at 6.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 5-7.
53. Carson v. Atari, Inc., No. 530743 (Super. Ct. Cal., Santa Clara County, second
amended complaint filed May 4, 1984); see also Dworkin, Ex-Atari Workers Sue Over Layoffs,
San Francisco Chron., Aug. 16, 1983, at 2, col. 5; Atari Ex-Employees Sue, Charging Firm
Concealed Layoff Plan, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1983, at 14, col. 3.
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several causes of actions based on fraud and misrepresentation of fact.5 4
Another legal strategy that is currently being used to prevent a busi-
ness relocation or closure is to take over the business through eminent
domain proceedings. The City of Oakland, California, has attempted to
take over the Raiders' football team franchise, claiming that the takeover
would be for a valid public use because it would serve the community's
recreational needs. 5" Both workers and communities in Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts have considered taking over factories in danger of
closing by using eminent domain proceedings. In one case, the threat of
such legal action was enough to change the employer's mind.5 6 The criti-
cal issue, when and if these cases reach the courts, is the extent to which
courts will extend the "valid public purpose" requirement of the eminent
domain proceeding.57
54. Second Amended Complaint for Damages, Carson v. Atari, Inc., No. 530743 (Super.
Ct. Cal., Santa Clara County, fied May 4, 1984).
An important issue in the Atari case is what constitutes reasonable notice. The California
Labor Code states that "[ain employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the
will of either party on notice to the other." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1984). The
Atari plaintiffs must establish how much notice they were due and did not receive in order to
prove a violation of this code section.
An EOAA could help them and other victims of plant closures by establishing a legal
basis to determine what constitutes reasonable notice. As argued later in this Note, EOAAs
would be more effective if they contained notification requirements for plant closures. Proper
notice would better equip employees to evaluate, propose, and implement buyout plans. See
infra notes 161-63 & accompanying text. The amount of notice required under an EOAA
could then theoretically be used to determine what reasonable notice is required for the layoffs
that result from plant closures.
55. The City of Oakland began eminent domain proceedings to take over the Oakland
Raiders football team on February 22, 1980. The city received a temporary restraining order
and, later, a preliminary injunction to prevent the team from relocating during trial. City of
Oakland v. Superior Ct., 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 271 (1983). The trial court granted defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, but the California Supreme Court reversed that decision.
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60 (1982). The supreme court held that
intangible property, like a football franchise, could be acquired by eminent domain and that
the city had the right to attempt to demonstrate that its takeover of the Raiders would be for a
valid public purpose. Id. at 66-72. The court remanded the case for consideration of that
issue. Id. at 76.
On remand the trial court denied the city's application to reinstate the preliminary injunc-
tion. The court of appeal, however, granted the plaintiff's request for a writ of mandate requir-
ing the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the application. City of Oakland v.
Superior Ct., 136 Cal. App. 3d 565 (1982). The trial court held the hearing and reinstated the
preliminary injunction. See City of Oakland v. Superior Ct., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 271.
The trial on the eminent domain action began on June 30, 1983, and in early August 1983
the trial court's tentative decision to dismiss the action became final. Id. at 271-72. In another
writ of mandate proceeding, the court of appeal ordered the trial court to vacate its judgment
and proceed in accordance with the law of the case established by its own and the supreme
court's rulings. Id. at 272, 280. To date there has been no final decision in this case.
56. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1984, at Al, col. 6; see Stout, Eminent Domain and Bank Boy-
cotts, LAB. RESEARCH REv., Summer 1983, at 12-19.
57. City of Oakland, 32 Cal. 3d at 69-73.
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In California, workers and labor and community organizations pre-
vented a plant relocation by preventing one city from raiding another's
industrial base. 58 The city of Vacaville attempted to use redevelopment
funds to provide a company from another community financial assistance
to relocate in Vacaville. Through political pressure and legal action, the
employee and community groups were able to stop this abuse of public
funds. Their strategy is an example of an overall attempt that should be
made to keep communities and states from encouraging businesses to
relocate in the area at the expense of workers in a previous location.
Creative legal strategies are an essential part of the overall effort to
stop plant closures. The litigation based on these new strategies, how-
ever, is still in the formative stages, and it is unclear whether it will suc-
ceed. Thus, other options must be considered.
Plant Closing Legislation
Plant closing legislation includes laws that require an employer to
give notice to his/her employees or the government that a plant is being
closed. Such legislation frequently requires that employers pay severance
pay to their employees when the plant is closed. Some legislators have
taken the initiative against plant closures by introducing this type of leg-
58. In early 1983 Simpson Dura-Vent, a chimney pipe manufacturer, announced that it
would relocate from Redwood City, California, to Vacaville, California. The company wanted
to relocate in order to take advantage of a $2.5 million dollar offer of tax-exempt loans and
other subsidies. These incentives were offered by the Vacaville Redevelopment Agency, which
was created pursuant to California Health & Safety Code § 33200 (West 1973 & Supp. 1984).
The Redevelopment Agency offered Simpson Dura-Vent these economic incentives using its
authority under California's Industrial Development Financing Act. CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 91520 (West Supp. 1984). The Redevelopment Agency sought court validation of its author-
ity to provide financing for the company to close its operations in Redwood City and move
them to Vacaville.
The Plant Closures Project, an Oakland, California, based organization helping workers
and communities stop plant closures or mitigate their effects, joined with the United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine, Local 1412 (UE), the union representing the workers at Simpson Dura-
Vent's Redwood City plant, and two named individuals who would have been affected by the
relocation to oppose the validation. They filed an opposition to the Redevelopment Agency's
complaint, claiming that the proposed financing was unlawful under a California statute
prohibiting public entity financing of plant closings in one part of the state and relocation to
another.
On July 12, 1983, the Redevelopment Agency signed an agreement with the Plant Clo-
sures Project and the UE to drop its request for validation and to withdraw its offers of assist-
ance to Simpson Dura-Vent. The city also agreed to require any other businesses receiving
redevelopment loans to adopt an affirmative action plan, to give continued recognition to any
union that represented its workers prior to relocation, and to provide at least one year advance
notice of plans to reduce or cease operations in its prior location. The City of Vacaville has
passed an ordinance incorporating these requirements. Answer and Opposition to Complaint
for Validation, Vacaville Redevelopment Agency v. Garcia, No. 84213 (Super. Ct. Cal., Solano
County); Shorrock, California City Passes Landmark Plant Closure Bill, 5 MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR 4 (1984).
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islation in various state legislatures and in the United States Congress.5 9
The enactment of plant closing legislation, however, has been extremely
difficult and often impossible.60
Plant closing legislation requiring notice and severance pay cur-
rently exists in only two states: Maine and Wisconsin. The Maine law
requires that employers give notice and provide severance pay to their
employees in certain plant closing situations. 61 In Wisconsin an em-
ployer of one hundred or more employees is required to give sixty days
notice to the state's Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Rela-
tions in the event of "relocation or cessation of business."'62 Other states
have recently passed legislation addressing the plant closure problem, but
that legislation does not require notice or severance pay.63
In addition, the cities of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have enacted
ordinances requiring notice of plant closuresA4 The Pittburgh ordinance,
however, was recently declared unlawful because it violated the city's
Home Rule Charter and invaded the primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB. 65
59. See, e.g., H.R. 379, H.R. 807, H.R. 2827, H.R. 4031, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
H.R. 565, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 7315, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Alaska H.R.
274, 11th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980).
Representative William Ford, democrat from Michigan, has sponsored many of the con-
gressional bills, including this year's H.R. 2847, the National Employment Practices Act.
Speaking recently at a national conference on economic dislocation and job loss, Representa-
tive Ford was pessimistic about the possibility that H.R. 2847 would be enacted. He said that
election concerns would prevent this Act and other worthwhile legislation from passing.
Michigan Congressman on Plant Closing Bill, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 306 (April 16,
1984). See generally Note, Advance Notice of Plant Closings: Toward National Legislation, 14
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 283 (1981).
60. Note, supra note 59, at 283-84; see also Kay & Griffin, supra note 2, at 209-15; Wall
St. J., June 26, 1984, at 27, col. 1; letter from New York State Senator Walter J. Floss, Chair-
man Standing Committee on Commerce and Economic Development to Author (Oct. 25,
1983) (discussing a New York plant closing bill and its limited chances for successful passage)
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Floss Letter].
61. "Any person proposing to relocate a covered establishment outside the state shall
notify employees, and the municipal officers of the municipality where the plant is located, in
writing not less than 60 days prior to the relocation." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-
B(6-A) (Supp. 1983).
62. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1983).
63. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-3-5 (Supp. 1983) (authorizing the Commissioner of Labor
to assist employees out of work because of plant or industry closures); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 32-9p(b) (West Supp. 1984) (authorizing tax benefits to communities suffering from
plant closures by including communities suffering from a major plant closing, relocation, or
layoff within the definition of "distressed community").
64. Pittsburg, Pa., Ordinance 21 (1983); Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance No. 1118 (June 17,
1983).
65. Smaller Manufacturers Council v. City Council of Pittsburgh, No. 6D 83-11245, (Ct.
C.P. Pa., Allegheny County, declaratory judgment entered August 19, 1983). This decision
has not been appealed. Letter from D.R. Pellegrini, City Solicitor, Department of Law, City
of Pittsburgh to Author (Oct. 11, 1984) (discussing the ordinance and court proceedings)
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Plant closing legislation is a strong, but controversial, response to
plant shutdowns and relocations. Currently, however, the majority of
American workers cannot consider it a viable solution because so few
state and local governments provide this type of legislation.
Summary
Plant closings are difficult, though not impossible, to prevent given
the current state of the law. Labor law provides limited remedies, the
application of other legal theories is uncertain, and in most states plant
closing legislation is unavailable. Workers, communities, and unions are
left largely to their own devices to deal with a closure. One way they
have faced this challenge is to buy the plant from their employer.
Employee buyouts involve complicated issues. For instance, em-
ployees must be able to determine whether the business will be economi-
cally viable. They must also decide how to finance the buyout and what
form their ownership will take. Most importantly, they must be aware of
the possibility of a buyout and may need assistance in confronting legal,
economic, and political problems likely to arise during the buyout pro-
cess. Legislation has been passed in a few states to help employees buy
out plants in danger of closing. The remainder of this Note will examine
some of the issues faced by employees in a buyout effort and analyze the
legislation to determine its effectiveness in promoting buyouts.
Overview Of Employee Ownership Structures And Current
Legislation
There are two types of employee ownership: worker cooperatives
and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPS). 66 Worker cooperatives
are structured to provide for democratic control by the workers. A coop-
erative is owned and controlled directly by the workers. Each worker is
a member of the cooperative, and each member owns one share of and
has one vote in the cooperative.67 The basic principle of cooperatives is
that membership rights, which consist of voting rights and rights to net
earnings, are personal rights that attach to the status of employee of the
company. 68
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal). The Philadelphia ordinance is still in effect.
Letter from Claudia Becker, Assistant City Solicitor of Philadelphia to Author (Nov. 19, 1984)
(discussing Philadelphia's plant closing ordinance).
66. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP & THE CONFERENCE ON AL-
TERNATIVE STATE AND LOCAL POLICIES, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: ISSUES, RESOURCES AND
LEGISLATION 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP]; Pitegoff, Worker Owner-
ship: Is it a Strategy for Labor?, LAB. UPDATE, July-Aug. 1982, at 9.
67. Pitegoff, supra note 66, at 10.
68. Id.; EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 66, at 3.
There are new types of worker cooperatives which have been structured to solve the
problems encountered by past worker cooperatives. All cooperatives allow members to own
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Although worker cooperatives are not uncommon, 69 ESOPs are the
more prevalent arrangement.70 ESOPs are defined in the federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),71 and ERISA's defini-
tion is generally incorporated into state legislation on employee
ownership.72 There are essentially three types of ESOPs: 73 leveraged, 74
non-leveraged, 75 and tax-credit.76 The leveraged ESOP is used most
often in an employee buyout.77 The statutory requirements for an ESOP
are complex. For example, the plan must meet certain tax and security
regulations.78 However, ESOPs are flexible and can be designed to estab-
lish different financing and ownership arrangements.
only one share. Each share has one vote, and each member has the right to a job in the
cooperative. Traditional cooperatives have encountered problems when the cooperative be-
comes successful and the value of shares rises. Eventually, the price of shares becomes so high
that no one can afford to buy one, and thus new members are unable to join. This becomes a
problem as older employees want to leave the company and sell their shares. In response to
this situation, alternative cooperative models have been formulated. The Mondragon coopera-
tives were developed in Spain and have been very successful. Under this model, share prices
do not increase. Instead, the cooperative's net earnings are distributed into each member's
account and may be collected by the member upon leaving the cooperative. EMPLOYEE OWN-
ERSHIP, supra note 66, at 15-17.
69. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 66, at 15.
70. Id. at 3.
71. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, & 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1982) states:
The term "employee stock ownership plan" means a defined contribution
plan-
(A) which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus and a
money purchase plan both of which are qualified under section 401(a), and which are
designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities; and
(B) which is otherwise defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
A plan shall not be treated as an employee stock ownership plan unless it meets
the requirements of § 409A(h) and, if the employer has a registration-type class of
securities (as defined in § 409(e)(4)), it meets the requirements of § 409A(e).
72. See infra note 100.
73. All ESOPs are considered to be a category of deferred employee contribution plans.
Essentially the employer establishes a trust in which each employee then makes contributions
to the trust which benefit the employer and employees in different ways depending on the type
of ESOP established. Marsh & McAllister, ESOP's Tables: A Survey of Companies with Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans, 6 J. CORP. L. 551, 554-55 (1981).
74. In a leveraged ESOP the employer guarantees any loans the trust borrows from
banks. The trust then uses the loan to buy shares of the employer's company. Id. at 556.
75. Non-leveraged ESOPs are not designed to obtain loans because the employer does not
guarantee the loan. Id. at 557-58.
76. An employer makes contributions to a tax credit ESOP for which the employer gets
an investment tax credit. Id. at 557-58. Recently the form for a tax-credit ESOP contribution
has been changed. Rather than receiving a tax-credit for a qualified investment, the employer
receives a credit based on a percentage of the payroll. See NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: A PROGRAM FOR NEW JERSEY 16 (1982).
77. See EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 66, at 13.
78. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(2), 4975(e), (f) (1982).
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Unlike a cooperative, employee shares of the company's stock in an
ESOP are held by a trust, and the statutes do not always require that the
participants have full voting rights. 79 As a result, an ESOP can be less
democratic than a worker cooperative and does not guarantee worker
control.80
Legislation encouraging employee ownership is not always designed
to support both the worker cooperative and the ESOP models of owner-
ship. Broadened ownership assistance acts (BOAAs) are concerned only
with broadening the base of capital ownership through ESOPs. 8' They
do not offer incentives or guidelines for dispersing the ownership of capi-
tal through cooperatives.8 2 EOAAs, on the other hand, generally do not
distinguish between these models of employee ownership. They en-
courage employee buyouts through either cooperatives or ESOPs in the
event of a plant closure.8 3 As the following discussion indicates, BOAAs
differ from EOAAs in other ways. As a result, they are not as useful in
buyouts attempted to prevent plant closures.
Broadened Ownership Assistance Acts
BOAAs rest on a theoretical foundation developed by Louis
Kelso.8 4 Kelso maintained "that a broader distribution of the ownership
of productive wealth . . . would help to remedy many of the problems
that plagued the United States economy."8s 5 He promoted ESOPs as a
way to achieve this goal.8 6 The federal government was the first to enact
legislation encouraging employee ownership through ESOPs.8 7 Congress
has introduced legislation that encourages the use of ESOPs and im-
proves their structure. 88
More recently, several states have enacted BOAAs. In some states
79. Marsh & McAllister, supra note 73, at 571; see also EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra
note 66, at 12.
80. Lewin, Worker Held Enterprises, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1984, at D2, col. 1; Minsky,
Gripes of Rath, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
81. See infra notes 84-92 & accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. See infra notes 93-100 & accompanying text.
84. L. KELSO & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); see also Marsh &
McAllister, supra note 73, at 558.
85. Marsh & McAllister, supra note 73, at 558.
86. Id. at 558-60.
87. Although not expressly excluded, the federal and state legislation which is based on
Kelso's broadened ownership ideas does not support worker cooperatives.
88. E.g., Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5, 13, 19, 26, 28, & 31 U.S.C.); Employment Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 8, 26, 29,
31 & 42 U.S.C.); Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985
(1974) (codified in scattered sections of 31 & 45 U.S.C.). See generally Marsh & McAllister,
supra note 73, at 560-63.
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the statute simply declares the state's policy to broaden the base of capi-
tal ownership by encouraging the use of ESOPs.89 In addition to these
policy statements, some states have passed legislation supporting broad-
ened ownership through securities law reforms90 and tax law reforms.91
These laws, through their policy statements as well as their relaxed se-
curities and tax requirements, encourage employers to offer ESOPs to
their employees. They do not necessarily encourage employees to utilize
an ESOP in order to buy out a plant in danger of closing.
BOAAs do not specifically address plant closures and do not pro-
vide state assistance or resources to employees interested in employee
ownership. Rather, they encourage employers to offer ESOPs to their
employees through policy statements and/or relaxed security and tax
regulations. By the time EOAAs were enacted, federal legislation sup-
porting employee ownership was already in effect.92 EOAAs have ex-
panded the ownership principles embodied in both BOAAs and federal
legislation by adapting them to the plant closure situation. BOAAs,
however, can be useful in an employee buyout to prevent a shutdown by
offering tax advantages and relaxed security regulations to employee
owned businesses.
Employee Ownership Assistance Acts
EOAAs have been passed in California, 93 Illinois,94 Michigan,95 and
89. "It is the policy of this state to encourage the broadening of the base of capital owner-
ship among wider numbers of Delaware citizens, and to encourage the use of employee stock
ownership as 1 means of broadening the ownership' capital." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 6508(c) (Supp. 1984).
"[B]roadening the ownership of capital should be a twin pillar of economic policy, along
with achieving full employment. . . . [E]mployee stock ownership plans. . . make an impor-
tant contribution toward the broadening of capital ownership .... MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 14J(a) (1982).
90. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(14) (Supp. 1983) (This statute exempts
the sale of securities to an employee stock ownership plan trust from the regulations of §§ 11-
205 and 11-501. These sections require, among other things, the filing of advertisements in-
tended for distribution to particular buyers and the registering of securities.).
91. Act of Dec. 31, 1982, ch. 15, 1983 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 92 (West) (codified at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.26(2) (West Supp. 1984)) (allowing a tax deduction for employer
contributions to an employee's trust, annuity plan, or stock ownership trust).
92. See supra notes 87-88 & accompanying text; infra notes 93-96 & accompanying text.
93. Employee Ownership Assistance Act of 1983, ch. 998, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347
(West) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91502.1(b)(3); scattered sections of CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE (West Supp. 1984)).
94. Employer Ownership Assistance Act, Pub. Act No. 82-991, 1982 Ill. Legis Serv. 2584
(West) (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1301-1313 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983)).
95. Act of July 2, 1979, Pub. Act No. 44, 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts 62 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.751-.759 (Supp. 1983)) (lapsed 1984). This statute was enacted in
1979 and lapsed in July, 1984, pursuant to its sunset provision. A bill to replace and expand
the lapsed statute is currently pending in the Michigan legislature. See supra note 18.
New York.96 In contrast to BOAAs, EOAAs are specifically designed to
address plant closures. For instance, the purpose of Illinois' EOAA is:
[T]o encourage the employees of plants that are about to be perma-
nently closed, or be relocated, to acquire such plants, with the consent
of their owners, and to continue to operate them as employee-owned
enterprises, thereby retaining the jobs that would otherwise be lost,
and strengthening the economic base of this State.97
EOAAs may include the cooperative as a viable employee owner-
ship model,98 although, practically speaking, they more readily facilitate
ESOPs.99 Like BOAAs, EOAAs address the issue of control under an
employee ownership plan, if at all, only to the extent that federal law
does. 100
Unlike plant closing legislation, EOAAs have been enacted with rel-
ative ease.10' In all of the states that currently have EOAAs, the at-
tempts to pass plant closing legislation have failed. 0 2 EOAAs differ
from plant closing legislation because they do not directly regulate plant
closures. Plant closure legislation essentially places conditions on an em-
ployer's decision to close a plant by requiring him to give the employees
notice of the closure or to give them severance pay after the closure. In
contrast, EOAAs propose employee buyouts as a response to a closure,
but do not directly affect the employer's decision to close a plant. For
this reason, EOAAs may be seen as an attractive alternative to the enact-
ment of controversial plant closing legislation.103
A determination of the effectiveness of EOAAs as an alternative to
plant closure legislation requires an understanding of the basic provisions
of EOAAs.
96. Act of July 30, 1983, ch. 788, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1478 (codified at N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAW §§ 1801(11)(a), (14) 1836(a)-(g) (McKinney Supp. 1983)).
97. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1302 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
98. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.751(c) (Supp. 1983) (lapsed July, 1984).
99. For instance, EOAAs often give preference to employees who receive a substantial
portion of their buyout funding from outside and/or private sources when determining eligibil-
ity for state funds. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1306 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB.
AUTH. LAW § 1836d (McKinney Supp. 1983). Since the banking community may generally
be less willing to lend to cooperatives than to more traditional ESOPs, this requirement may
effectively force employees to adopt an ESOP model of ownership.
100. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91502.1(c)(1) (West Supp. 1984) (This statute gives
ESOP employees voting rights in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 409A(e) (1982). 26 U.S.C.
§ 409A(e) regulates voting rights on registration and non-registration type securities, but does
not address how the internal operation of an employee owned company should be regulated.);
see also N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1836(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (employees must control
majority of voting stock, or, if held in trust, employees must elect trustees).
101. See Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies, Legislative Brief, Worker
Ownership Assistance for Labor and Citizen Groups in Michigan: HB 4119, at 3 (June 24,
1981) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Brief].
102. Note, supra note 59, at 283-84.
103. Legislative Brief, supra note 101, at 3.
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Analysis and Comparison of EOAAs in Illinois, New York, and
Michigan' o4
All EOAAs include provisions relating to financing and administra-
tion, but there are differences in what each state has provided in these
areas. The following discussion will lay out the different provisions each
state has enacted.
Administration
The EOAAs in Illinois, New York, and Michigan all give an ex-
isting department in the state government the responsibility of encourag-
ing employee ownership.10 5 In Illinois, the Department of Commerce
and Community Affairs is authorized to assist employee owned enter-
prises by: Fostering the employee-owned enterprise's relationship with
federal, state, and local government; conducting research and educa-
tional programs; obtaining managerial, technical, and financial assist-
ance; and simplifying licensing and application procedures whenever
possible.'0 6 In addition, the Illinois statute establishes an employee-
104. In 1981 New Jersey passed a Worker Owned Corporation Study Act which directed
the Department of Labor and Industry to conduct a study concerning ESOPs and, pursuant to
its findings, to develop a plan to encourage the formation of ESOPs. The goal of this Act was
to make it a high priority of the relevant state agencies to help workers save jobs by forming
ESOPs. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:1B-30 to IB-35 (West Supp. 1984).
According to the plan developed by the Department, a bill has been introduced in both
the New Jersey Senate and Assembly entitled the Employee Stock Ownership Plan Act.
Similar to EOAAs, the bill's purpose is to avert plant closures. However, it is limited to
assisting the formation of ESOPs and is primarily focused on regulating and defining their
operation. A. 3325, 201st Leg., 1st Sess.; S. 3174, 102d Leg., Ist Sess. Unlike the legislative
history in Illinois, Michigan, New York and California, these bills have met with some
resistance. The governor has vetoed the Assembly Bill largely because of his opposition to the
tax exemption provisions in the bill. Letter from Governor Thomas H. Kean to General
Assembly (Sept. 6, 1983) (discussing his veto).
Recently the New Jersey Legislature, using the findings of the study, did enact a statute
which encourages employee ownership. Employee Stock Ownership Plan Act, ch. 471, 1983
N.J. Sss. Law Serv. 2654 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52.27H-90 (West Supp.
1984). The enacted statute recognizes that employee stock ownership plans offer a mechanism
for the retention of jobs which would be lost through plant closures. The statute declares that
it is in the public interest to assist employee stock ownership plans. This statute specifically
mentions the findings of the study and includes language from the report which warns that
"great care should be taken to avoid the waste of public and private resources and the bitter
disappointment of the employees that might result from the employee acquisition of an
obsolete, overpriced or otherwise undesirable facility." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52.27H-90(d)
(West Supp. 1984).
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.752-.753 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. COM. LAW § 104a (McKinney Supp. 1983).
106. The statute states that the Department is authorized to
assist and counsel new employee-owned enterprises, in their dealings with federal,
state and local governments, receive complaints and suggestions concerning policies
and activities of federal, state and local governmental agencies which affect em-
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owned enterprise advisory council to instruct both employee-owned busi-
nesses and the Department about the issues concerning employee owner-
ship. The Council also reviews and approves loans to employee-owned
enterprises. 10 7
In New York the Department of Commerce has the responsibility
for encouraging employee ownership. The Department's duties are simi-
lar to those of the Illinois Department of Commerce. New York's stat-
ute, however, also gives its Department the authority to "[i]dentify
industrial and manufacturing businesses that are in danger of being per-
manently closed or relocated out of state . . .and [to] assist the busi-
nesses and employees of such businesses by distributing information
about the provisions of this section." 10 8
Michigan's Department of Labor, in cooperation with the state's
Department of Commerce, 10 9 was also authorized to take an active role
during an employee buyout. Besides serving as an information source for
individuals and organizations interested in a buyout, the Department
could evaluate the feasibility of a proposed employee-owned corporation.
The Department also could provide technical assistance, counseling serv-
ices, and training during a buyout effort and during the operation of an
employee-owned corporation. In addition, the Department could facili-
tate the efforts of local, state, federal, and private agencies to assist em-
ployee ownership and could recommend legislative or executive action to
enhance opportunities for employee ownership.' 10
Financing
Another feature of EOAAs is a provision for the financing of em-
ployee-owned businesses. Illinois' EOAA contains the most liberal fund-
ployee-owned enterprises, conduct investigations, research, studies and analysis of
matters affecting the interests of employee-owned enterprises, assist employee-owned
enterprises in obtaining available managerial, technical and financial assistance, initi-
ate and encourage educational programs relating to employee-owned enterprises and
help new employee-owned enterprises in Illinois by simplifying and streamlining li-
cense and application procedures wherever possible.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
107. Id. § 1305.
108. N.Y. COM. LAW § 104-a (McKinney Supp. 1983). This section also allows the de-
partment to impose fees to defray departmental expenses incurred in the execution of its du-
ties. Id.
109. The original bill referred only to the Department of Labor. The amended bill, how-
ever, assured the participation of the Department of Commerce. Michigan Department of
Commerce, Analysis of Sub House Bill 4119 (H-2) (May 30, 1979) (.unpublished memoran-
dum) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
110. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.753 (West Supp. 1983) (lapsed July, 1984). Section
450.756 gave the Department power to hold meetings of interested parties and conduct an
initial feasibility study if the Department became aware that a business was closing. The De-
partment could also have been made aware of a closure under Michigan's voluntary notifica-
tion provision.
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ing assistance provisions. The Illinois statute authorizes its Industrial
Development Authority to loan money to employee ownership associa-
tions, but only with Advisory Council and authority approval.111 In ad-
dition, the Illinois statute sets standards and restrictions for granting the
loans, including a requirement for a minimum of fifty percent outside
financing. 112
New York's EOAA empowers the Job Development Authority to
enter into a loan agreement with an employee ownership association if
the authority approves the loan.113 The Act also establishes application
and loan requirements, including at least sixty percent outside funding,
reasonable assurance of repayment, and fairly restrictive loan preference
standards. 1 14
Michigan provided the least coverage in this area, authorizing noth-
ing more than Department of Labor assistance in obtaining financing." 15
Additional Provisions of the Michigan EOAA
The Michigan EOAA, in addition to containing administrative and
financing provisions similar to those of the New York and Illinois
EOAAs, had two unique features. First, the Michigan statute en-
couraged businesses to give the Department timely notice about a deci-
sion to close or relocate.' 1 6  Second, the Act required that the
Department give the legislature a yearly report listing the number of in-
dividuals and establishments helped or likely to be helped by the Depart-
ment and a biennial report "describing the effectiveness of the act in
maintaining employment within the state."' "17
California's EOAA
In September 1983118 California enacted an EOAA which, although
111. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1309(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1308(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). There is a bill currently
before the Illinois General Assembly which would remove financing percentage requirements
entirely. Preference would still be given to projects with higher outside funding percentages.
A. 364, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1984).
113. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1801(1l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
114. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1836-c, 1836-d, 1836-e(2), (3) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
115. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.753(e) (West Supp. 1983) (lapsed July, 1984).
There was, however, an attempt made to amend the Act to include funding for feasibility
analysis, market studies, and ESOP development. Letter from James Houck, Section Chief,
Community Development and Technical Assistance Section, Office of Industrial Training,
Michigan Department of Labor to Author (Sept. 27, 1983) (discussing Michigan's EOAA)
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Houck Letter].
116. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.755 (West Supp. 1983) (lapsed July, 1984).
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.757-.758 (West Supp. 1983).
118. Employee Ownership Assistance Act of 1983, ch. 998, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347
(West) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91502.1(b)(3); scattered sections of CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE (West Supp. 1984)).
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amended several times after its introduction, met with no major
opposition. 119
Like EOAAs in other states, the California EOAA contains provi-
sions for financing arrangements and allocates responsibility for promot-
ing employee ownership to a state agency, the Department of Economic
and Business Development (DEBD). 120 The DEBD is responsible for
"assisting employees of a business or place of work in the formation of an
employee-owned corporation . . . by providing technical assistance, in-
formation, or access to sources of financing."' 121 In addition, the Office of
Local Economic Development' 22 is required to "[c]ooperate with state
and federal agencies in making grants or loans to . . .employee-owned
corporations. . . for the purpose of establishing or expanding local eco-
nomic development projects which will increase employment
opportunities."123
The Act has specific, although limited, provisions that include au-
thorization for the issuance of revenue bonds. The state may issue bonds
to aid "[t]he transfer of ownership of a business. . . which has closed or
is in danger of closing, to its employees for the purpose of formation of
an employee-owned corporation" if consumer benefits will result from
the transfer. 124
The Act adds several sections to California's Unemployment Insur-
ance Code. 125 One section mandates that the coordination and special
services plan of the State Job Training Council, 126 which administers
money available from the federal Job Training Partnership Act,127 facili-
tate employee ownership. 28 In another section, the Employment Devel-
opment Department 129 is directed to administer reemployment assistance
funds for displaced workers. 130 Finally, the state indirectly provides some
119. Interview with Leonard Goldberg, Legislative Aide to Assemblyman Tom Bates
(Sept., 1983) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg Interview].
120. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15330 (West Supp. 1984).
121. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15330(0 (West Supp. 1984).
122. The Office of Local Economic Development is one of the four divisions of the De-
partment of Economic and Business Development (DEBD). CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15325
(West Supp. 1984). The DEBD is the state agency responsible for overseeing the economic
development of California. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15330 (West Supp. 1984).
123. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15332(b) (West Supp. 1984).
124. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 91502.1(b)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1984).
125. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 10527 (West Supp. 1984).
126. Establishment of a state job training coordinating council is required by 29 U.S.C.
§ 1532 (1982) in order for the state to recieve financial assistance under the Job Training Part-
nership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982) (codified at scattered sections of 18 & 29
U.S.C.).
127. Pub. L. No. 97-300, §§ 121-127, 96 Stat. 1322, 1337-43 (1982) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1537 (1982)).
128. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 10527 (West Supp. 1984).
129. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 301 (West Supp. 1984).
130. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 15086(f) (West Supp. 1984).
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financial support for the employee ownership effort by permitting per-
sons engaged in a buyout to collect unemployment compensation
benefits.13 1
The most controversial section of the Act was a provision for a tax
credit for a company which, seeking to sell its assets to its employees,
contributed to the cost of the feasibility study and donated "land, build-
ings, [or] other non-moveable equipment and stationary assets" to an em-
ployee-owned corporation. 132 Because this provision was rejected in the
enacted Bill, 133 employees interested in employee ownership may find it
more difficult to obtain funding for preliminary feasibility studies. Pri-
vate funding for preliminary feasibility studies can be difficult to obtain
because neither the lender nor the borrower knows whether the buyout
will be successful. Once a preliminary positive evaluation of the business'
chance for success has been made, however, private funding for more in-
depth studies is more easily obtained. 134
Another major provision that was deleted from the final version of
the Act was an amendment exempting the purchase of an employee-
owned corporation's stock from section 25110 of the California Corpora-
tion Code. 135 Section 25110 requires that all securities sales meet the
qualifications of California Corporation Code sections 25111, 25112, or
25113, including the provisions of those sections for notification and for
the issuance of a permit. 136 Representatives of the California Depart-
ment of Corporations opposed this provision because they believed there
was no basis for the exemption. 137 The Department reasoned that a
public purpose would be served by retaining the review and qualification
requirements provided for under general securities law. 138 The compro-
131. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253 (West Supp. 1984).
132. A. 1728, § 7, 1983-1984 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.. The opposition was apparently based
on an administrative aversion to tax credits. Goldberg Interview, supra note 119.
133. See Employee Ownership Act of 1983, ch. 998, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West).
134. Interview with Catherine Squire, Staff Member, Department of Economic and Busi-
ness Development and Regional Director, National Center for Employee Ownership (Sept.,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Squire Interview].
135. Section 25110 makes it "unlawful for any person to offer or sell in this state any
security in an issuer transaction ... unless such sale has been qualified under sections 25111,
25112 or 25113." CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25110-25113 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984). Compare A.
1728, § 4(n), 1983-1984 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. with Employee Ownership Act of 1983, ch. 998,
1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West).
136. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25111-25113 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
137. Letter from William Kenefick, Legislative Coordinator and Senior Corporation
Counsel, California Department of Corporations to Assemblyman Tom Bates (May 25, 1983)
(discussing the Department of Corporations' opposition to the original version of A.B. 1728)
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Kenefick Letter].
138. The Department also believed that the simple disclosure of risks required under the
amendment did not adequately replace the merit standard approach of the current law. The
provision had required that when stock was sold to employees, they be provided with clear
information about the risks and responsibilities of their purchase. Current law provides that
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mise that was enacted requires that ESOPs file with the Department of
Corporations, but mandates that the Department "shall develop an expe-
dited procedure for the review of an application for authority to sell se-
curities to an employee-owned corporation."' 139
Analysis Of EOAAs
There are two essential questions that must be addressed when ana-
lyzing EOAAs. First, the Acts must be evaluated to determine whether
they are effectively designed to reach their expressed goals. Second, they
must be examined to determine how they fit into an overall scheme to
deal with plant closures. Evaluation of EOAAs is facilitated by analyz-
ing how they are structured and operate in different states. This Note will
focus on the California and Michigan statutes for comparison
purposes. 140
The goals of EOAAs are to encourage employee ownership by help-
ing workers buy their workplaces in the event of a plant closure and
thereby to strengthen the economic base of their communities.' 4 ' To
achieve these goals, legislators need to ask what will make employee
buyouts and ownership successful. The National Center for Employee
Ownership has identified several factors necessary for success: mobiliza-
tion of the employees and community, including active participation
from any union at the plant; a viable firm; technical assistance, especially
from current owners, management and government; a viable organiza-
tional structure for the employee-owned enterprise, including a recogni-
tion that employees often expect increased participation; and time "to
pull all the pieces together before the plant closes."' 42 Adequate funding
for the buyout and subsequent business operation is another highly sig-
nificant factor. 43
EOAAs do contain provisions that address some of these success
factors. For example, all EOAAs currently in effect provide some type of
state financial assistance. 44 Lack of financing has been identified as one
the Commissioner of the Department of Corporations may refuse to issue a permit for the
issuance of securities if the Commissioner finds that such an issuance is not fair, just, and
equitable, that the applicant might commit fraud, or that the applicant does not conduct his/
her business honestly. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West 1977); Kenefick Letter, supra note
138.
139. Employee Ownership Act of 1983, ch. 998, § 10, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West).
140. Though the Michigan EOAA has lapsed pursuant to its sunset provision, see supra
note 18, it provides one of the better models for comparison, in part because it was in existence
longer than any other EOAA has been.
141. For a clear statement of an express goal of EOAAs, see supra note 97 & accompany-
ing text.
142. C. SQUIRE, supra note 3, at 17-26.
143. L. WINTNER supra note 13, at 4; EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 66, at 22.
144. See supra notes 111-15, 120-31 & accompanying text.
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of the major reasons why Michigan's EOAA was not more successful. 145
A fundamental flaw in California's EOAA is that funding for the
implementation of employee ownership is largely discretionary. 146 Cali-
fornia's strategy is to identify existing government funding programs in
which support for employee ownership is a legitimate use of the funds.147
The California State Job Training Council, for example, is directed to
facilitate employee ownership.148 Although this could include using part
of the discretionary funds from the Job Training Partnership Act to as-
sist buyouts, that strategy is not expressly mandated by the Act. There-
fore, the Council's willingness to allocate funds to support employee
ownership depends on whether the Council concludes that economic de-
velopment as well as job retraining is one of its goals. If the Council
limits its role to retraining workers displaced by a plant closure, it will
not provide much assistance to workers who decide to buy the business
instead of finding new jobs. 149
In addition, the California law only requires the DEBD to en-
courage employee ownership if private funds are available or if state
funds are specifically allocated by the legislature for this purpose. 150
Thus, the Act does not guarantee that the DEBD will establish programs
or make other efforts to assist employee ownership.
An additional shortcoming of the California Act is that it does not
include a provision encouraging the use of feasibility studies. 151 Such
studies, however, are vital to ensure that a business is both economically
and organizationally viable.'5 2 Without a feasibility study, financial and
technical assistance might be provided to businesses that are likely to fail.
This result would waste government money and do little to strengthen
the economic base of the state.
Another means to avoid waste of financial and technical assistance
is to ensure that departments of state government are responsible for im-
plementing the EOAA, especially by searching for viable businesses that
are in danger of closing. California law, however, does not require the
DEBD to perform any outreach functions. 153 Thus, the statute creates a
145. Houck Letter, supra note 115.
146. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15330(0 (West Supp. 1984).
147. Goldberg Interview, supra note 119.
148. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 10527 (West Supp. 1984).
149. Squire Interview, supra note 134.
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15330(0 (West Supp. 1984).
151. See Employee Ownership Act of 1983, ch. 998, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West).
Unfortunately none of the EOAAs currently in effect mefition the necessity of feasibility stud-
ies nor expressly provide for their funding. But see supra note 110 & accompanying text
(Michigan statute provided for feasibility studies).
152. C. SQUIRE, supra note 3, at 21; EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 66, at 27. See
generally L. WINTNER supra note 13, at 7-33 (case studies of employee buyouts in which feasi-
bility studies were conducted).
153. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 15330(0 (West Supp. 1984). In fact, only New York requires
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relatively passive role for the DEBD in the employee buyout process be-
cause the Agency must wait until assistance is requested by workers or
other groups interested in a buyout. 15 4 Consequently, potentially suc-
cessful economic enterprises may close without any buyout attempt if the
employees fail to attempt a buyout or to request assistance, while less
economically promising buyouts may be assisted simply because these
employees requested DEBD assistance.
Finally, the success of EOAAs depends, in part, upon the coopera-
tion between the involved groups: the community, the company, the la-
bor organization, and the employees. 155 The few EOAAs presently in
effect, however, do not require that the implementing agency solicit or
encourage the cooperation of these groups. The Michigan statute was
the exception, permitting the Department of Labor to promote efforts by
private as well as public agencies in the formation of an employee-owned
corporation. 15 6 Even this limited provision, far less than an express man-
date, made the Michigan statute more effective than the California stat-
ute, which does not encourage any involvement from non-governmental
organizations. 157
The shortcomings of these various EOAAs illustrate that this type
of legislation essentially functions merely as a policy statement. EOAAs
constitute a strong public statement endorsing employee ownership as
one solution to a plant closure. The Acts reinforce this policy statement
by providing that some state administrative attention and funds be di-
rected to the promotion of employee ownership. They fail to provide,
however, adequate guidelines to the administrative departments respon-
sible for encouraging employee ownership. For example, California's
EOAA requires the Department of Economic and Business Development
to assist the formation of an employee-owned operation by providing
technical assistance. 158 The Act, however, does not elaborate on the na-
ture of the technical assistance nor the manner of providing it.
Broad mandates are not enough to help workers deal with a com-
plex plant closure situation and to develop buyout strategies. The admin-
istrative agency as a whole may have no knowledge of, interest in, or
time to learn about employee ownership and plant closures. If so, its
assistance will be of limited value. In some agencies particular individu-
the implementing department to engage in such an outreach program. See supra note 108 &
accompanying text.
154. See Letter from Kathleen P. Starrick, Manager, Office of Program Development, Illi-
nois Dept. of Commerce and Community Affairs to Author (Nov. 4, 1983) (discussing the
Illinois Ownership Assistance program and the fact that no company or prospective employee
owners have availed themselves of this service) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
155. See supra note 142 & accompanying text.
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.753(f) (Supp. 1983) (lapsed July, 1984).
157. See Employee Ownership Act of 1983, ch. 998, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West).
158. Id. § 4f.
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als may have experience with, or may take the initiative to learn about,
employee-ownership and thus be capable of developing and implement-
ing plans to support buyouts. However, a successful response to a plant
closure is too important to leave to coincidence.' 5 9
Furthermore, EOAAs generally do not provide a means by which
the legislature can oversee the departments to determine whether they
are being successful or even conscientious in carrying out their responsi-
bilities. 160 Without some follow up requirements, administrative agen-
cies may become lax or ineffectual in fulfilling their duties, especially in
the absence of a strong legislative mandate to implement the EOAA.
Unless these agencies provide effective support for employee buyouts,
even the limited goals' 61 of EOAAs will not be met.
In addition, EOAAs cannot effectively encourage employee owner-
ship unless they can be fully utilized by employees affected by plant clo-
sures. A serious flaw in all EOAAs is that they fail to require employers
to give notification of the impending closure. Although the Michigan
statute did provide for voluntary notification, in a four year period
marked by thousands of plant closings only one company complied. 162
An employee buyout is a complicated and time consuming process.
Studies must be made to determine if the business is viable, funding
sources must be found, and decisions concerning the form of ownership
must be made. Most importantly, the workers must be organized and
prepared to take over the business in order to run it productively and
profitably. Therefore, notification is necessary to provide employees with
sufficient lead time to ensure a successful buyout. Lack of sufficient lead
time is one reason why employee buyout efforts, assisted under Michi-
gan's statute, were not more successful. 163
Legislators have been reluctant to impose notification requirements
on employers. For example, plant closing legislation that requires notifi-
cation of an impending closure has been extremely controversial and dif-
ficult to enact.164 In the face of such opposition to plant closing
legislation, legislators have turned to EOAAs as an alternative response
to plant closures.
159. Squire Interview, supra note 134.
160. See statutes cited supra notes 93-96. Only Michigan required a report from its De-
partment of Labor about the department's progress in supporting employee buyouts. See
supra note 117 & accompanying text.
161. The primary goal of EOAAs is to assist workers when they confront the complexity
of employee ownership options, laws, financing sources, etc.. See generally supra notes 93-139
& accompanying text.
162. Houck Letter, supra note 115.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 60 & accompanying text. There are many arguments against plant
closing legislation, including the belief that it is a significant governmental step into areas
traditionally considered to be management's domain. M. BOLLE, OVERVIEW OF PLANT
CLOSING, supra note 3, at 13-21; see also Floss Letter, supra note 60.
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EOAAs have not been promoted as substitutes for plant closing leg-
islation, but they have been pursued as an alternative method for ad-
dressing the problem of plant closures. 165 EOAAs do not approach a
potential plant closure from the same perspective as plant closing legisla-
tion. They do not regulate the employer's decision to close a plant or
provide compensation to the workers displaced by a closure. Rather,
EOAAs are a more politically palatable mechanism for the state to have
some influence over a plant closure. Because they are not designed to
accomplish the same goals as plant closing legislation, EOAAs cannot be
criticized for failing to accomplish these goals. However, legislators, by
failing to include pre-notification provisions in EOAAs, have run the risk
of making EOAAs ineffective in promoting employee buyouts. Without
notification, by the time employees find out their employer is shutting
down the workplace, it may be too late for a buyout, even with state
assistance.
Recommendations For Improving EOAAs
EOAAs could be more effective if they contained implementation
guidelines. One useful implementation measure would be to require that
the implementing agency allocate funds specifically for employee-owner-
ship assistance, rather than leave funding to the department's discretion.
This would help ensure that the department will take an active role in
promoting employee ownership. An EOAA should also require the state
to appropriate funds for this purpose. In California, it is especially im-
portant to ensure that the DEBD receives private or state funding be-
cause in the absence of funding, it is not required to support employee
ownership.
Although legislative authorization for funding may be difficult to
obtain in these days of fiscal restraint, advocates of EOAAs should em-
phasize that plant buyouts may well be cost-effective. If a plant closes
and buyout efforts are not made or are unsuccessful, state money will
probably be spent on welfare and unemployment benefits.
The EOAA should also require that once funding for employee-
ownership assistance is allocated, a portion of the funds must be spent on
salary for permanent staff in the departments responsible for implement-
ing the employee-ownership assistance statute. The departments should
be required to spend this money not only on salary, but also on staff
training so that the agency responsible for assisting buyouts will provide
informed and effective assistance to employees.
Additionally, the EOAA should promote buyouts that are likely to
succeed. Specific provisions should be included in EOAAs requiring
funding for feasibility studies. If the legislature is reluctant to provide
165. See supra notes 93-103 & accompanying text.
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direct state funding for these studies, an alternative approach should be
adopted. For example, the initial EOAA proposals in California offered
tax incentives to employers who helped to finance a feasibility study.1 66
Similar feasibility study provisions should be incorporated into EOAAs.
Another implementation guideline is to require that the act specify
the kind of technical assistance to be provided by the responsible agency.
For example, departments should be required to provide assistance to
employees in choosing the form of ownership of the business. Similarly,
departments should be instructed to gather and to provide information
concerning the different tax, security, and financing regulations which
will affect each form of ownership. Finally, the departments should
make information available to employees regarding their prospective in-
come from, and liability for, the business.
Furthermore, the EOAA must be designed to ensure that the re-
sponsible agencies implement the mandate of the statute to support em-
ployee ownership. A requirement for periodic reports to the legislature
from the implementing agency, such as those that were required by
Michigan, 167 should be incorporated into all EOAAs.
In the absence of widespread adoption of plant closing legislation,
EOAAs must include some notification requirement. Knowledge that a
plant will close is essential for a successful employee buyout. If employ-
ees, communities, and the government do not have adequate notice, they
can only make hasty attempts to purchase the plant and save jobs. The
success rate of employee buyouts would increase if these groups were
provided with enough notice to evaluate properly the business' viability
and to develop appropriate, effective buyout plans and employee owner-
ship structures. If legislation requiring mandatory notice cannot be en-
acted through plant closing acts or through EOAAs, then at least
voluntary notice should be required.
Finally, EOAAs should contain provisions mandating that the im-
plementing department take an active role in promoting employee own-
ership. This can be done in a number of ways. First, businesses, unions,
and interested community organizations should be contacted and in-
formed about the act. Second, the department should educate workers
and communities about the telltale signs of an impending plant closure
and suggest that if a closure is likely, an employee buyout may be an
appropriate solution. Third, the department should make attempts to
discover plants in danger of closing and to encourage both the owner and
employees to consider a buyout, if the business appears to be an economi-
cally viable operation.
By taking an active role, the state agency will be generally more
effective in saving jobs through employee buyouts. More workers and
166. See supra note 132 & accompanying text.
167. See supra note 117 & accompanying text.
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communities will know about the possibility of using an employee buyout
to prevent a plant closure, and they will be better informed about how to
make the buyout successful.
It is especially important for the agency to take an active role when
there is no notification requirement imposed by the statute. Without no-
tification from the company, employees must learn to detect indications
of an impending closure in order to deal with it effectively.
The linchpin in the series of recommendations made above is the
requirement for adequate notice of the plant closure. The outreach and
funding recommendations, however, can be complementary strategies
used to ensure that employees with notice of a closure have at their dis-
posal much of what is necessary for a successful employee buyout. The
outreach provisions are absolutely essential as long as mandatory notice
requirements are nonexistent. 168
Conclusion
In certain circumstances, an employee buyout is an appropriate al-
ternative to a plant closure. Employees, communities, and states benefit
when a plant remains in operation because of a successful employee
buyout. Legislation, such as EOAAs, that encourages and supports em-
ployees in a buyout attempt is an extremely important part of the buyout
process. The buyout and subsequent employee ownership of a business
can be complicated. Technical, financial, and other forms of state assist-
ance can help employee-owned companies through troubled times.
Although EOAAs are not the only appropriate legislative response to the
plant closure problem, EOAAs must be developed as part of an overall
state response to plant closures.
Employee ownership, however, may not be appropriate for every
plant that is in danger of closing. Moreover, employee buyouts take time
to effectuate. Unless employees have adequate notice, they will not be
able to utilize EOAAs even if a buyout is appropriate. Further, in order
to be effective, EOAAs must provide implementation guidelines, includ-
ing specific provisions that regulate how funding will be generated and
spent. Otherwise, the governmental departments responsible for imple-
menting EOAA policies may not spend their time, energy, and money in
ways which effectively assist employee buyouts and ownership.
Virginia L. Duquet*
168. New York has put emphasis on outreach in its EOAA. N.Y. COM. LAW § 104-a
(McKinney Supp. 1983); supra note 108 & accompanying text. Legislators should pay atten-
tion to how well this strategy works.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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